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Medication errors are too frequently assigned as blame towards a single person. By 
considering these errors as a system-level failure, healthcare providers can take significant 
steps towards improving patient safety. The patient safety agenda has gathered pace since 
the US Institute of Medicine launched its 1990 report ‘To err is human: building a safer 
health system’[1]. Analysis of landmark events including the UK’s ‘Mid-Staffs’ crisis[2] has 
also revealed that adverse events are rooted in system failures. A distinct patient safety 
research and educational agenda has emerged[2]. 
 
‘Systems thinking’ is a way of better understanding complex workplace issues; exploring 
relationships between system elements to inform efforts to improve; and realising that 
‘cause and effect’ are not necessarily closely related in space or time. This approach does 
not come naturally and is neither well-defined nor routinely practised in healthcare. When 
under stress, the human psyche often reduces complex reality to linear cause-and-effect 
chains. The need to identify a single cause of an incident is embedded in healthcare: 
patients and families understandably often need to see ‘someone’ held to account, and 
healthcare ‘wrongs’ fall under a tort system where assigning ‘blame’ releases 
compensation. We believe that real safety improvements require healthcare staff, leaders 
and decision-makers at all levels to develop systems-thinking competencies and behaviours 
 
Harm and safety 
Harm and safety are the results of complex systems, not single acts. Despite this, the 
terms ‘safety’ and ‘systems’ are frequently used in healthcare, yet they are rarely defined 
and are often used arbitrarily and interchangeably. 
Dul et al. define a ‘system’ as “a set of interrelated (coupled) entities united in a joint 
purpose”[3]. ‘Entities’ can be physical objects, technology, processes and relationships, as 
well as organisational and legal constraints. When entities are tightly coupled (explicitly 
linked and interdependent), specific changes can cascade rapidly through the system, which 
cause a ripple effect that may only be felt at a distance. While system size can, and does, 
vary, healthcare systems are often large, complex and sociotechnical. With so many 
interactions between entities, outcomes can be difficult to predict; a concept known as 
emergence. Because safety is an emergent property, safety management is highly complex. 
Unfortunately, emergent properties are often managed independently, rather than 
systematically.  
We define safety, in relation to systems, as the level of system performance required to keep 
the incidence of harm (and risk) as low as reasonably practicable. While this definition   
requires consensus on ‘acceptably low’ incidence, it is more useful than the definitions used 
in healthcare, on the rare occasions when it has been defined. In these instances, safety is 
usually held as the prevention of ‘medical error’: something that is unachievable in a 
complex sociotechnical system. ‘Medical error’ unfairly blames individuals: adverse 
outcomes are inevitably issues related to systems, with multiple interacting contributory 
factors that vary  over time and circumstances; this makes ‘root causes’ difficult to pin 
down. 
 
Problems for pharmacy 
Health and social care are being increasingly delivered in the community by multi- 
professional teams that require “knowledge, skills and attributes to work across sectors”[4]. 
While some professions (particularly medicine and nursing) are more accustomed to this, 
pharmacy’s recent integration has not been seamless[5]. 
There is a lack of understanding of the rapidly evolving pharmacist role, which is likely to 
see more involvement in managing illness through a pharmaceutical care model[6],[7]. This 
may mean taking sole responsibility (and accountability) for patient outcomes. There are 
obstacles  to this transition; pharmacy’s capacity for change is hampered by established 
interprofessional dynamics. Jorgenson et al. suggest that pharmacists interpret their roles 
through the lens of   their relationship with doctors[5]. With uncertainty over relationships 
between accountability, responsibility and autonomy, we suggest that a lack of clarity of 
system design further inhibits change. 
 
Education is key to developing safety competence. The Francis report recommended that 
clinical placement should be quality assured, because attitudes, values and behaviours of 
staff can influence student learning and undermine patient safety[2],[8]. Pharmacy is 
particularly affected: with the dearth of MPharm programme placements, bias attitudes 
stem from  students’ own pharmacy-related employment, invisible to academic staff; their 
influence on learning is, therefore, impossible to predict. 
The legislative framework that allows dispensing errors to be treated as a criminal offence is 
also an issue for pharmacists. While successful prosecutions under the Medicines Act 1968 
are rare, recent cases indicate prosecutors are willing to seek custodial sentences[9]. Holding 
individuals responsible for errors contradicts fundamental safety science principles, is 
counter- productive to learning and inhibits the open reporting essential for understanding 
system behaviour. However, new legislation to protect pharmacists from prosecution was 
passed by committees in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons in December 
2017. 
 
Human Factors as a framework for supporting safety 
Understanding safety as an emergent property is complicated by the difference between 
‘work as imagined’ (defined within standard operating procedures [SOPs]) and what 
actually happens in a dynamic, pressurised workplace[10]. The relationship between these 
two states must be explored during normal system operation, rather than with a focus on 
(comparatively rare) adverse events. The perceived value of the latter relies on flawed 
assumptions that there is an identifiable cause, and that this cause likely involves human 
error. 
It is important to define the operating space within which performance can safely occur. In 
this way, errors can be contained to mitigate process deviation (‘workarounds’). Incident 
investigations often identify errors, or deviations from or violations of SOPs, which are 
assumed to be the ‘cause’; an approach often referred to as ‘Safety-I’[10]. This approach 
fails to recognise that most workarounds occur safely as a result of necessary adaptive 
behaviour to ‘get the job done’; i.e. humans responding to an inappropriate process design 
in a busy working environment, often with limited resources. Clamping down on all 
‘unsafe’ deviations leads to ‘terror of deviation,’ which hinders continuous improvement. 
‘Safety-II’ identifies key features of successful tasks; it reveals that errors, deviations and 
violations are all part of normal work, and are often necessary for delivering successful 
outcomes in poorly designed systems. These necessary adaptations are known as 
‘functional resonance’, and identify weak points in the system and support intelligent 
redesign. 
 
How intelligent redesign may prevent wrong-route drug administration 
 
Wayne Jowett died following intrathecal injection of the chemotherapy vincristine, intended for 
intravenous delivery[11]. Cases like Jowett’s have been rare worldwide, but in each, the use of luer 
connectors was a contributory factor. Their reliable leak-free connection of fluid and drug 
administration devices means they are routinely used regardless of route of administration, and have 
been linked with multiple wrong-route administration accidents. Future events could be prevented by 
redesigning processes and equipment so that drugs are intrathecally administered using only devices 
that cannot connect to intravenous equipment — a recommendation made by the National Patient 
Safety Agency in 2009[12]. 
 
Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Human factors and ergonomics (HFE) practice has much to offer. In the UK, this is regulated 
by the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF). Like the General 
Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC), the CIEHF accredits education and training, and many HFE 
specialists are qualified to postgraduate level and beyond. HFE offers validated tools for 
modelling, redesigning and testing systems. Understanding HFE helps people to perform 
optimally and safely in complex systems, and all healthcare staff should develop basic HFE 
competencies to support their work. 
 
The potential for this is beginning to be realised. The 2016 Care Quality Commission 
briefing recognised that applying HFE principles can reduce the risk of adverse events 
reoccurring, and Health Education England has invested in staff training with HFE taster 
workshops[13],[14]. Similarly, NHS Education for Scotland (NES) routinely delivers HFE 
workshops. Other HFE- related developments include national implementation of ‘enhanced 
significant event analysis’, a systems-based approach to team-learning from safety 
incidents[15] and a human-factors critique of the existing general practice training 
curriculum[16]. Professional guidance for clinical educators on embedding HFE principles in 
healthcare curricula has also been published[17]. NES, along with the Royal College of 
Surgeons of Edinburgh (and multiple stakeholders), is leading the participatory design of a 
strategic plan to inform HFE integration, research and development, and building-related 
capacity and capability in NHS Scotland. 
  
Mistaking Quality Improvement for HFE 
Are we not already considering HFE? In healthcare, HFE is sometimes confused with 
quality improvement (QI), which is an important mechanism for improving patient safety. 
While QI focuses on process and technical issues, HFE focuses on jointly optimising 
human wellbeing and system performance[18]. In QI, the processes are mostly delivered by 
people; however, people are not the focus of the improvement. QI is an excellent tool for 
technically exploring processes, but without a holistic systems approach, effectiveness may 
be limited. We believe QI and HFE offer synergies; both need the other for successful 
system improvement. 
Healthcare-specific conflation of the terms ‘human factors’ and ‘factors of the human’ also 
hampers effective embedding of healthcare HFE. The latter includes communication and 
team working, often called ‘non-technical skills’. While non-technical skills training has 
proved effective in certain settings (surgical teams, for example), the lack of a wider 
design-based systems approach makes it unsuitable for systemic quality management. Even 
where genuine HFE approaches have been used in healthcare, the benefits are not always 
fully realised because HFE input occurred too late: after the initial design phase. 
 
The future 
Evidence from other sectors suggests that HFE can improve patient safety, but there is much 
to do. In the case of Jowett (See ‘Box: Intelligent redesign may prevent wrong-route drug 
administration’), despite the National Patient Safety Agency’s recommendations, compliance 
for all similar scenarios has not yet been achieved worldwide. Such a change requires multi- 
sector co-operation, including manufacturing and regulatory bodies, as well as healthcare 
organisations. Reducing the risk of wrong-route administration does not introduce new 
risks.  
 
Taking HFE approaches can address problems such as this. Developing HFE competencies    
has implications for education and the aforementioned guidance can help support the  
embedding of HFE into curricula[19]. HFE can be supported in pharmacy by engaging with 
the CIEHF Pharmaceutical Human Factors Special Interest Group. This UK forum allows 
pharmaceutical professionals to explore HFE’s impact on safety, wellbeing, quality and 
productivity in the healthcare product system, from factory to bedside, in a way that it has 
not been explored before. 
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